recognized, this danger is particularly acute among federal anticorruption statutes. 1 The cluster of federal criminal laws that can be described as antibribery statutes are alarmingly easy to violate. Many people want favors from public officials, many people treat public officials generously, and public officials do favors for each other. That is simply how the system works. Sometimes, however, these favors can resemble illegal gratuities and quid pro quos. When individuals and groups influence public officials, how can courts and juries distinguish political corruption from mere political effectiveness?
Admittedly, real bribery-bribery that harms the integrity of the political process-is a critical issue that should be vigorously prosecuted. However, courts should construe anti-corruption laws narrowly so public officials and donors need not live in fear that their legitimate campaign contributions or shrewdly executed backroom deals may expose them to criminal liability. Accordingly, this article argues that the "corrupt intent" element found in many bribery statutes, requiring juries to use their own moral reasoning to determine if a benefit given to or from a public official was given with an evil mind, is crucial. Without this "evil mind" element, swaths of benign political activity would be criminal. For this reason, the United States Supreme Court has stated that anti-corruption laws should be narrowly construed. 2 The best way to construe them narrowly is to ensure that corrupt intent remains a robust element of these offenses.
To pilfer a phrase from Justice Harlan in Griswold v. Connecticut, the word "corruptly" in the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), sits on its own bottom. 3 This article specifically argues that the adverb "corruptly" must carry some meaning in addition to the quid pro quo described by the other statutory elements. Breathing life into "corruptly" is necessary to avoid the rule against surplusage and to comply with the United States Supreme Court's desire, expressed in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, that criminal anti-corruption statutes be narrowly construed to avoid capturing benign political activity. 4 The corrupt intent element achieves this end by demanding that juries, in addition to uncovering a quid pro quo, exercise their moral intuition and find that the defendant offered or accepted the bribe with an evil and blameworthy purpose. As a paradigm to demonstrate the functionality of the corrupt intent element of the crime of bribery, this article focuses on bribery-bycampaign contributions. 5 Part I surveys the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, and its legislative intent. Part II examines how federal appellate opinions have treated the term "corruptly"-in cases involving § 201 as well as in other federal laws that prohibit bribe-like activity-with particular attention paid to the phenomenon of campaign contributions as bribes. Part III assesses "corrupt intent" in light of the element's historical background and discusses how different political philosophies yield divergent definitions of political corruption. Part IV attempts to delineate the circumstances under which a campaign contribution is given "corruptly," thus constituting an unlawful bribe.
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal bribery and gratuities statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, describes several ways to violate its provisions. The provision criminalizing bribing a public official, provides:
(b) Whoever-(1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or promises anything of value to any public official or person who has been selected to be a public official, or offers or promises any public official ... to give anything of value to any other person or entity, with intent-(A) to influence any official act; or (B) to influence such public official ... to commit or aid. . . any fraud .. . on the United States; or person ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned for not more than fifteen years, or both. .. 6 Subsection (b)(2) has similar wording, but describes the crime from the perspective of the official rather than the person offering the bribe. ' Bribing a public official thus requires proof of five essential elements: (1) a public official; (2) the defendant's corrupt intent; (3) a benefit-"anything of value"-given, offered, or promised to the public official; (4) a relationship between the thing of value and some official act (or fraud or omission of duty); and (5) the relationship must involve an intent to influence the official in carrying out the official act (or to induce the fraud or omission).
Subsection (c) of § 201 describes the crime of unlawful gratuity. This crime is important to the discussion of "corrupt intent" because
7. Subsection (b)(2) provides that whoever: (2) being a public official or person selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for:
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act; (B) being influenced to commit or aid ... any fraud ... on the United States; or (C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of the official duty of such official or person ... shall be fined. . . or imprisoned ....
Id. § 201(b)(2)
. This article will refer to subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) collectively as "the Federal Bribery Statute." 8. See id. 9. Subsection (c) provides, in part, that whoever:
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty-(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official; or (B) being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value personally for or [Vol. 51 the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Bribery Statue emerged in the context of differentiating it from the Federal Gratuities Statute. 10 In order to prevent anti-bribery laws from criminalizing normal, productive political behavior, the corrupt intent element must be read to narrow the scope of those law. In particular, the element must require there be something intuitively immoral about the act in question, beyond the mere presence of a quid pro quo.
In this regard, Sun-Diamond fundamentally shaped the application of § 201. There, the United States Supreme Court attempted to differentiate a bribe under § 201(b) from an unlawful gratuity under § 201(c). 1 The Court specifically compared the language in the Federal Bribery Statute ("intent to influence any official act") with the language in the Federal Gratuities Statute ("for or because of any official act"), and found the fundamental difference was that bribery requires a specific quid pro quo.1 2
The Court held that § 201(c) required the prosecution to prove some connection between the gratuity and an official act, whereas under § 201(b) the giving of the "thing of value" would constitute a "bribe" only if the gift-giver intended to influence a particular official act in the future.13 Accordingly, the Court emphasized the primary difference between these two crimes is the briber's intent to effectuate a quid pro quo. However, defining bribery as a quid pro quo involving a public official does not obviate the statute's difficulties. The second element--corrupt intent-appears to demand something more. When "anything of value" is given to a "public official" with the "intent to influence" some "official act," .a quid pro quo, including a specific intent mens rea, has been established. What function, then, does the corrupt intent element serve? As discussed infra, some courts define "corruptly" as intending to execute a quid pro quo; however, this because of any official act performed or to be performed by such official or person ....
Id. § 201(c)
. This article will refer to subsection (c) as "the Federal Gratuities definition effectively reads the word out of the statute.
14 Defining "corruptly" in a way that simply restates other elements of the crime is redundant and directly conflicts with the statutory interpretation rule against surplusage.1
5
The effect of omitting the "corruptly" element is: many public officials will unwittingly violate the terms of the Federal Bribery Statute on a regular basis. One instance is what is known as "statebribery," which occurs when one public official receives a political benefit from the official acts of another public official. 16 Hypothetically, for example, candidate A may agree to refrain from running against candidate B for state senate if candidate B will endorse candidate A in the state house race. Another common practice that could arguably violate the Federal Bribery Statute is "logrolling" (also known as "vote-trading"). Logrolling occurs when, for example, legislator A offers to support legislator B's bill if legislator B supports additional funding for legislator A's pet project. Both of these illustrations involve a quid pro quo, and both are the sorts of agreements legislators make on a regular basis. Yet, legislators who swap political favors and votes are not necessarily criminals. As discussed infra, most of these agreements are not corrupt, because they neither harm the character of the official nor are they against the interest of the public.' influence an officeholder's decisions by giving targeted campaign contributions, the threat of creating an illegal quid pro quo becomes very real. 24 Therefore, ascribing independent substance to the corrupt intent element of bribery is necessary on two grounds: to avoid rendering the corrupt intent element redundant, but also to avoid criminalizing innocent conduct.
Defining corruption as merely quid pro quo, without requiring more, criminalizes a range of common, beneficial legislative behavior. Without this freestanding "corruptly" element, the Federal Bribery Statute risks being over-inclusive and could lead to unintended consequences. First, the statute's broad scope creates a danger of selective prosecution. If most politicians regularly violate the statute (by trading political favors or votes, or by accepting contributions from special interest groups), then a prosecutor could use the statute to target almost any public official at any time. Second, because some types of quid pro quos are common and useful features of the legislative process, the expansive reach of the Federal Bribery Statute threatens to punish or deter otherwise innocuous legislative behavior. The threat of selective prosecution and potentially broad liability could have a chilling effect on productive political activity.
Some courts and legislatures have recognized this danger, and have thus required that prosecutors prove corrupt intent as a standalone element of the crime of bribery. 25 This requirement mitigates the risk of over-inclusivity and enables juries to distinguish legitimate campaign contributions from unacceptable bribes.
26
As courts have 24. See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 707 F.3d 607, 613-14 (6th Cir. 2013) (exploring the thin line separating the political donor who "gives money in the hope of unspecified future assistance" and who makes a contribution so the public official will "do what I asked him to do"-only the latter of which is a "corrupt bargain" and, hence, a bribe).
25. See Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions, supra note 21, at 132 ("[T]he corrupt intent element adds a normative requirement that is not entirely captured by the descriptive elements.").
26. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently explained, the presence or absence of a corrupt agreement is the type of question "juries are fully equipped to assess":
[M]otives and consequences ... are the keys for determining whether a public official entered an agreement to accept a bribe, and the trier of fact is quite capable of deciding the intent with which words were spoken or recognized, not every campaign contribution is "a bribe in sheep's clothing." 27 Accordingly, juries must parse the individual facts to determine when a campaign contribution contains a "corrupt bargain" that seeks to turn a public official into "a donor's marionette." 2 8
In some instances, when state bribery statutes have omitted the corrupt intent element, courts have read the element into the statute.
29
These opinions appear to recognize that without some sort of normative intensifying factor, like corrupt intent, bribery laws would criminalize the day-to-day transactions of most politicians.
30
Once corrupt intent is understood as a freestanding element of bribery, the problem becomes how to sculpt a workable definition of "corruptly. element by requiring juries to make an intuitive judgment about whether the conduct at issue was immoral under the circumstances. However, there is no one-size-fits-all definition of corruptly. 32 Rather, prosecutors must argue to the jury some theory of why the quid pro quo was corrupt. The precise theory will differ from crime to crime and jury to jury. The important fact is that not all quid pro quos are immoral. Defining corruption as an element that depends on the "moral judgment" of the jury ensures that benign quid pro quo actions will not engender unmerited punishment. Moreover, a bribery instruction that requires the jury to find an "evil mind" or "morally blameworthy" motive would put public officials on notice that, although they will be penalized when their political arrangements violate society's intuitive principles of fairness, duty, and justice, they will not be held liable for innocuous quid pro quo behaviors.
The proposition that "corrupt intent" is an additional substantive element beyond the quid pro quo is expressed in Matthew Bender's Modern Federal Jury Instructions for Bribery of a Public Official:
Corrupt intent means simply having an improper motive or purpose. The defendant must have promised, offered or given money or a thing of value to the public official with the deliberate purpose of influencing an official act of that person. This involves conscious wrongdoing, or as it has sometimes been expressed, a bad or evil state of mind. 33 32. As Professors Mills and Weisberg explain in their historical survey of the word "corruption":
In history and the social sciences, there is a vast academic literature on the subject of describing and defining corruption-a body of work so vast that we can only briefly allude to it here. But any review of this scholarship must acknowledge that it is very difficult to derive any consensus definition of corruption or to measure the alleged harm of what positive law calls corruption, and that any effort at a positive or even normative definition of corruption is heavily contingent on independent economic, political, and social factors. This instruction, which continues to be used in bribery trials, 34 does an adequate job of expressing both the quid pro quo aspect of corrupt intent as well as the something more-"a bad or evil state of mind." 35 The instruction illustrates that the corrupt intent element requires juries to make an additional finding of intuitively immoral motivation.
Similarly, the United States Attorneys' Criminal Resource Manual, while recognizing that "the statute is a little confusing in this respect," counsels federal prosecutors to specify to the court that the word "corruptly" in the Federal Bribery Statute "simply means 'with a bad or evil purpose."' 36 Therefore, as both a practical and theoretical matter, anti-bribery laws must carry an element of corrupt intent. Determining corrupt intent requires a moral judgment on the part of the jury. Without this element, anti-bribery laws threaten to criminalize a great deal of benign political behavior. Presently, not all courts agree with this conclusion.
II. A BRIEF SURVEY OF "CORRUPTLY" IN

FEDERAL APPELLATE OPINIONS
Is this "moral judgment" understanding of corrupt intent being followed by federal appellate courts?
This Part traces the development of the interpretation of "corruptly" and demonstrates that, although the moral judgment interpretation is still alive, most courts construe "corruptly" as simply requiring a quid pro quo without addressing--or perhaps even realizing-that this creates redundancy within the statute. merely required "criminal negligence" was reversible error. 37 Bribery, the court said, is a specific intent crime. 38 Accordingly, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed, per the correct portion of the jury instructions, "an evil intent to violate the law." 39 Another frequently cited case is United States v. Brewster, where a United States Senator was allegedly bribed by a lobbyist to oppose postal rate increases. 40 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, a professor with a leading reputation in the field of Election Law, 4 ' calls the Brewster opinion "long, confused, and highly evasive."42
A. "Corruptly" in § 201 Cases
In an article concerning campaign contributions as bribes, Lowenstein opines that "little purpose" would be served by extensively analyzing the case. 43 However, the United States Attorneys' Criminal Resource Manual contains an entire section analyzing Brewster. 44 The Brewster court analyzed § 201 in terms of the differences between bribery and illegal gratuities, 45 holding that illegal gratuity is a lesser included offense of bribery and that what separates the two offenses is the requisite level of intent. 4 6 The court held that the "corruptly" element of the Federal Bribery Statute "bespeaks a higher degree of criminal knowledge and purpose" than the analogous element in the Federal Gratuities Statute. 47 Likewise, the Federal Bribery Statute's phrase, "in return for being influenced in the performance of any official act," implied a higher degree of intent than the language of the Federal Gratuities Statute, to accept the same thing of value "for or because of any official act." 48 concluded that an otherwise legal campaign contribution could constitute a bribe under certain circumstances, but could never amount to an illegal gratuity: 49 Every campaign contribution is given to an elected public official probably because the giver supports the acts done or to be done by the elected official ... there is no distinction in the case of an elected public official between an illegal gratuity and a perfectly legitimate, honest campaign contribution.
0
If there is a specific quid pro quo, however, a campaign contribution can be a bribe. servant." 55 This conceptual intersection between bribery and contract law further fleshes out the briber's state of mind-he wishes to create a binding contract with a public official, in violation of the official's sworn duties.56
The Ninth Circuit directly tackled the definition of "corruptly" in the Federal Bribery Statute in United States v. Dorri." During deliberations, the jury asked the trial judge to clarify the meaning of "corruptly." 58 The judge had previously instructed the jury, using a model jury instruction for the Ninth Circuit, that "[a]n act is 'corruptly' done if it is done voluntarily and intentionally to bring about either an unlawful result or a lawful result by some unlawful method with a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to one's self or to another." 5 9
The defendant found this definition problematic because it effectively negated his defense. The defendant claimed he was not soliciting a bribe, but rather was setting up a one-man sting operation. 60 However, the defendant's innocent undercover work would be considered "corrupt" under this definition: he was seeking "a lawful result by some unlawful method" for "some benefit" because he hoped to impress his boss by exposing the bribe.61 Because the trial judge and counsel were unable to concoct a better definition, however, the judge instructed the jury that if they found "a gap between the law and the facts as you see them," they should deal with the gap "just by filling it, collectively."
62
The majority of the Ninth Circuit found no plain error or abuse of discretion and affirmed Dorri's conviction. 6 3 55. Arthur, 554 F.2d at 735 (emphasis added).
See id; see also U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 36, § 2044 ("[A]
bribe purchases a service (or at least is intended to do so) and is therefore bargainedfor; a gratuity is more in the nature of a tip.").
57. Dorri 64 vividly demonstrates the tension in the law of bribery that forms the heart of this article-the dominant quid pro quo definition of bribery is intuitively over-inclusive. Juries understand that some morally innocent behavior can be classified as a bribe, and they recognize the need for some extra ingredient to separate the truly corrupt and blameworthy actions from those that merely violate the letter-but not the spirit-of the law. Although the trial judge in Dorri seemed unable to capture this distinction in the form of a jury instruction, his response comes close to the position this article advocates, by instructing the jury to fill in the gap "collectively." 65 In other words, the judge instructed the jury to draw from their own collective powers of discernment and to rely on their consciences and collective intuition to differentiate good from evil, even when the text of the law provided them inadequate guidance in doing so.
But this is not the last word from Dorri. 6 6 Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski vigorously dissented, arguing that it was the judge's job to figure out the law and to instruct the jury properly, despite the defense counsel's failure to offer an alternative instruction.
67 "Corruptly," he explained, "is a concept that can't be easily captured in a single formula, as it varies too much from situation to situation." 68 Judge Kozinski recognized that the model instruction on "corruptly" was "hopelessly circular: If Dorri's conduct was illegal, then he was using an unlawful method, which means he was acting corruptly, There, the Court discussed the difference between the "intent to influence" necessary for a bribery conviction under § 201(b) and the gift "for or because of an official act" in the § 201(c) gratuities provision. 7 4 Based on this variation in language, the Court held the greater offense of bribery required a finding of a specific quid pro quo-something of value given in exchange for an official act-while an illegal gratuity merely required some link between the gift and a past or future official act."
Unfortunately, in the wake of Sun-Diamond, many courts have defined "corruptly" purely in terms of a quid pro quo. 76 Yet, SunDiamond did not address the "corruptly" element at all.n In differentiating bribery from gratuities, the Court focused solely on the "intent to influence." 7 8 The gifts given to the public official in Sun- Diamond could not constitute bribes under § 201(b) because they were not part of a quid pro quo arrangement. 79 Had there been a quid pro quo, the corrupt intent element would have come into play to determine whether the specific quid pro quo was corrupt and, thus, an unlawful bribe.
The Court's rationale in Sun-Diamond reinforces this reading of §
201(b).
The Court explained that criminal anti-corruption laws should be narrowly construed because they are merely strands in an "intricate web of regulations, both administrative and criminal, governing the acceptance of gifts and other self-enriching actions by public officials." 80 These criminal statutes, the Court said, are but "the tip of the regulatory iceberg." 8 1
If the Federal Bribery Statute is to be narrowly construed, the "corruptly" element logically can accomplish that narrowing. At present, the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the "corruptly" element of § 201(b), and lower courts are mistaken to believe Sun-Diamond stands for the proposition that proving bribery requires only quid pro quo without corrupt intent.
The majority of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, fell precisely into this trap. 82 In Alfisi, a fruit and vegetable wholesaler argued that, rather than being a participant in a bribe, he was a victim of extortion. 83 It was the routine practice among wholesalers at the Hunt's Point Market to pay kickbacks to USDA inspectors to prevent them from deliberately miscalculating the contract price of their produce. 84 Alfisi claimed the bribery and gratuity charges levied against him were actually based on his attempts to induce the inspectors to carry out their duties faithfully. 85 The majority opinion misconstrued Sun-Diamond, stating "[t]he 'corrupt' intent necessary to a bribery conviction is in the nature of a quid pro quo requirement; that is, there must be 'a specific intent to give ... something of value in exchange for an official act.""' Thus, according to the Second Circuit, if a quid pro quo was proven, Alfisi's only recourse would be to argue the defense of coercion." Although the court cited Sun-Diamond, an opinion that stated criminal anticorruption laws should be narrowly construed, the Alfisi majority pointed to the "danger of underinclusion" to bolster its holding that quid pro quo involving a public official invariably constitutes bribery. 88 Judge Sack dissented from the Alfisi majority, and persuasively argued that corrupt intent must be a separate element of bribery. Judge Sack believed the "corruptly" element requires that the briber seek to corrupt the official. "Bribery," he stated, "in essence is an attempt to influence another to disregard his duty while continuing to appear devoted to it or to repay trust with disloyalty." 89 Beyond merely seeking a quid pro quo, therefore, "the benefit sought must entail a breach of duty or trust." 90 Citing the "well-settled rule of statutory construction that all parts of a statute, if at all possible, are to be given effect," Judge Sack accused both the majority and the district court of merely using the statute's other terms to define "corruptly," thereby effectively reading "corruptly" out of the statute.91 He argued that the quid pro quo element described in Sun-Diamond arose not from the term "corruptly," but from the term "to influence." 92 Because the Sun-Diamond Court never considered the "corruptly" element, it would be a mistake to read Sun-Diamond as conflating the "corruptly" element with the necessity of a quid pro quo.
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Judge Sack's understanding of "corruptly" is correct. If "corruptly" describes a situation in which an official is tempted to breach public trust or to act hypocritically, the jury must so decide by way of its moral intuition. Although moral terms like "breach of duty," "disloyalty," and "evil state of mind" are familiar to common experience, they prove difficult to define. But putting flesh on these nebulous terms is exactly the sort of thing juries are designed to do.
The salient point is this: federal appellate courts face statutory construction issues in the application of the Federal Bribery Statute. The solution is to recognize that Sun-Diamond is not the final word on bribery. Indeed, the point of Sun-Diamond was to define unlawful gratuities. The Court did so by comparing gratuities to the "intent to influence an official act" element of bribery. The rule against surplusage and the Supreme Court's directive that criminal anticorruption laws be narrowly construed demand that "corruptly" must therefore carry some independent meaning. Specifically, "corruptly" signals that evil is afoot, and it demands that juries make case-by-case determinations as to whether the behavior they are asked to judge is truly morally blameworthy.
B. Bribery and Corruption Under Other Federal Laws
There are federal laws other than the Federal Bribery Statute that contain the "corruptly" element, while others include bribery as a lesser included offense. Some of these laws can also be triggered by a campaign contribution. This section briefly illustrates how a corrupt quid pro quo can trigger these other federal criminal laws, and how these laws relate to the Federal Bribery Statute and the element of corrupt intent. 
Hobbs Act
The majority of federal appellate court opinions in which campaign contributions are alleged to be bribes arise not in the context of the Federal Bribery Statute, but in the context of the Hobbs Act.
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The Hobbs Act criminalizes, among other things, any extortion that affects commerce in any way. 95 The term "extortion" in the Act includes "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced ... under color of official right." 96 The punishment for a Hobbs Act violation includes a sentence up to twenty years. 97 Hobbs Act case law has evolved in such a way that a violation for extortion under color of title almost perfectly mirrors the Federal Bribery Statute. In Evans v. United States, the United States Supreme Court upheld its earlier decision in McCormick v. United States that an explicit quid pro quo is necessary for a Hobbs Act color-of-title extortion conviction. 9 8 Two particular holdings from Evans are especially noteworthy. First, the quid pro quo need not actually materialize-the Act is violated by the existence of the agreement itself. 99 Second, Evans essentially eliminated the coercion element of extortion by noting that the mere fact that a public official holds public office is coercive in itself.' 00 In other words, the public official's "official power" is what induces the bribe. Thus, if a campaign contribution is proven to be part of a specific quid pro quo, and that contribution or agreement "in any way" affects commerce, the Hobbs Act has been violated. ' United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). Evans involved a cash payment of $7,000 to a member of the Dekalb County, Georgia, board of commissioners, as well as a $1,000 check payable to the commissioner's campaign. In sum, the corrupt intent element of the Federal Bribery Statute is also an element of Hobbs Act extortion by color-of-title, mail or wire fraud premised on a deprivation of the right to honest services, and federal program bribery.
Therefore, this article's conclusions regarding the "corruptly" element apply equally to these other federal crimes.
III. BRIBERY AND CORRUPTION IN LIGHT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
In his United States v. Aguilar concurring opinion, Justice Scalia opined that the term "corruptly," as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1505, was not unconstitutionally vague. 11 7 In fact, he explained, the term has "a longstanding and well-accepted meaning."" According to Scalia, something done corruptly is "done with an intent to give some comprehensible distinction between corrupt and non-corrupt political pressures.1 27 Under the mandate theory, a legislator's duty is to do what his constituents want, to be bound by their mandates and instructions. 128 Thus, pressure that does not reflect popular preferences undermines proper representation.
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A bribe that is consistent with popular preferences, therefore, would not be corrupt, while a bribe that causes the legislator to deviate from popular preferences would be. 130 Finding no definitive answer in political theory, Lowenstein proceeds to discuss bribery in terms of the type of harm it inflicts. Bribery can be intrinsically harmful, especially when the bribe appeals almost exclusively to an official's self-interests,'31 or it can be harmful because it births bad decisions, such as when bribery creates unacceptable advantages for the wealthy and well-organized.1 32 Both concepts of corruption apply when a jury is instructed that "corruptly" is an element that requires an intuitive judgment of moral blameworthiness.
Another aspect of political philosophy relevant to this discussion is preference intensity.133 Preference intensity suggests minority opinions may justly trump majority opinions when they are more intensely held than majority opinions. 134 For example, imagine that in a group of one hundred constituents, seventy people favor policy A with an intensity level of two. This would give policy A one hundred and forty intensity points. Now imagine that the other thirty people 127. Id Preference intensity applies to bribery in the context of campaign contributions because individuals and interest groups with intense preferences for particular policies will make campaign contributions in ways that express their policy preferences.' 3 ' These contributions may not be corrupt in the sense that they simply inform legislators of intensely held preferences among their constituencies.' 3 6 The United States Supreme Court has observed that money, when given in the form of a campaign contribution, can be a form of speech or, at least a speech-enabler. '1 So long as legislators are not making reciprocal promises, such as "I will support your issue in exchange for your contribution," no corruption has taken place. The official has not violated his duty, and the public has not been disserved. The official will know what his constituents want, and this knowledge will likely influence his future decisions.
Moreover, if the official was influenced by intensity of preference, rather than avarice, a jury may legitimately find the official committed no crime.
Another way to arrive at a workable definition of the "corruptly" element is to approach the element historically. Sociologist and law professor James Lindgren surveyed the historical roots of bribery and extortion and found the crimes overlapped theoretically, historically, and pragmatically. 138 Lindgren concluded these crimes were rooted in "the misuse of a representative power for personal gain." 39 In both early and contemporary law, therefore, corruption is tied to wrongfulness, duty, and advantage. Tamashasky believes the different meanings of "corruptly" that have emerged in federal courts stem from the different meanings of "unlawful advantage," which emerge on a case-by-case basis.1 49 Tamashasky further explains that, under English common law, crimes were divided into two categories: crimes against the laws of God and crimes against the laws of man. 150 Crimes against the laws of God were classified by the term "corruptly."' 5 1 Under this regime, "corruptly" was not an element of the crime, but a way of classifying the crime as an inherently immoral act-one that was malum in se, as opposed to mala prohibita.1
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Whether historically or philosophically approached, the definition of corruption appears to spring from the concepts of duty, improper advantage, and morality. Therefore, anti-bribery laws should be construed in such a way as to capture only the political quid pro quos that controvert an official's moral duty or create an unfair advantage. Whether a quid pro quo is corrupt is better decided by the moral intuition of a jury than by a one-size-fits-all definition.
IV. CONCLUSION-WHEN IS A CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION CORRUPT?
Campaign contributions can be corruptly given under several circumstances. For example, a donor may condition a campaign contribution on the candidate's promise to perform a particular future act. Conversely, a candidate may promise a particular act, on the condition that a contribution is given. In both circumstances, there is a quid pro quo-the reciprocity that distinguishes bribery and extortion from an unlawful gratuity. In both circumstances, there is also corruption. The bribing donor seeks an unfair advantage for himself; the soliciting official seeks self-enrichment in ways that 148 449 (Q.B. 1858) , that the word "corruptly" "classifies conduct rather than explicitly defining it"). subvert both his ability to apply his unbiased judgment and to fairly represent his constituents.
By requiring an "evil state of mind" to satisfy corrupt intent, the law criminalizes corrupt behavior without criminalizing more benign political behavior, such as logrolling and interest group contributions, which neither corrupt public officials nor betray public trust. Moreover, narrowing the corrupt intent element is harmonious with the United States Supreme Court's stated preference that federal anticorruption laws should be narrowly construed. Under each of these statutes, a finding of corrupt intent is necessary to avert the danger of over-inclusiveness. Additionally, with respect to § § 201 and 666 offenses, the corrupt intent element must embody something beyond the quid pro quo to avoid the problem of statutory surplusage. Specifically, the "corruptly" element demands that the quid pro quo was offered or solicited with an "evil mind." Such a finding is a moral judgment well-suited for jury determination.
While some jury instructions make the corrupt intent element explicit, not all do. This article therefore suggests, as a potentially helpful jury instruction:
"Corruptly" means that the defendant acted with an immoral purpose to secure an improper advantage for himself in violation of his (or the official's) duty to the public. Not every quid pro quo involving a public official is wrong or illegal. You the jury must find not only that a specific agreement existed, but that this agreement was morally blameworthy. [Vol. 51
See
Such an instruction would allow the jury to draw on its own collective moral intuition to decide whether the alleged arrangement was designed to enrich either the giver or the recipient in contravention of the official's duty to the public.
